Northern Ireland: Inquiries

Baroness Amos: My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has made the following Statement.
	On 1 April this year, I published Justice Cory's reports into allegations of state collusion in four murders in Northern Ireland. In doing so, I confirmed my intention to establish inquiries into the deaths of Robert Hamill, Billy Wright and Rosemary Nelson.
	I am pleased to be able to confirm today both the identities of the inquiry panels and the inquiries' terms of reference.
	In each case, the panels will be chaired by a judge and will include both a member with specialist expertise and a lay member. The terms of reference have been deliberately drawn to allow the inquiries to consider both the allegations of collusion that have been made in these cases and the issue of possible negligence.
	The Robert Hamill inquiry will be chaired by Sir Edwin Jowitt, a retired member of the High Court of England and Wales. He will be joined on the inquiry panel by Sir John Evans (former Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall) and Reverend Baroness (Kathleen) Richardson of Calow (former Moderator of the Free Churches' Council of England and Wales). The inquiry will be held under Section 44 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998. Its terms of reference will be:
	To inquire into the death of Robert Hamill with a view to determining whether any wrongful act or omission by or within the Royal Ulster Constabulary facilitated his death or obstructed the investigation of it, or whether attempts were made to do so; whether any such act or omission was intentional or negligent; whether the investigation of his death was carried out with due diligence; and to make recommendations.
	The Billy Wright inquiry will be chaired by the right honourable Lord (Ranald) MacLean of the Court of Session in Scotland. He will be supported in this role by Professor Andrew Coyle (Director of the International Centre for Prisons Studies at King's College, London) and the Right Reverend John Oliver (retired diocesan Bishop of Hereford). The inquiry will be held under Section 7 of the Prison Act (Northern Ireland) 1953. Its terms of reference will be:
	To inquire into the death of Billy Wright with a view to determining whether any wrongful act or omission by or within the prison authorities or other state agencies facilitated his death, or whether attempts were made to do so; whether any such act or omission was intentional or negligent; and to make recommendations.
	The Rosemary Nelson inquiry will be chaired by Sir Michael Morland, a retired member of the High Court of England and Wales. The other panel members will be Sir Anthony Burden (former Chief Constable of South Wales Police) and Dame Valerie Strachan (Vice Chair of the Big Lottery Fund and former Chairman of the Board of Customs and Excise). The inquiry will be held under Section 44 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998. Its terms of reference will be:
	To inquire into the death of Rosemary Nelson with a view to determining whether any wrongful act or omission by or within the Royal Ulster Constabulary or Northern Ireland Office facilitated her death or obstructed the investigation of it, or whether attempts were made to do so; whether any such act or omission was intentional or negligent; whether the investigation of her death was carried out with due diligence; and to make recommendations.
	As I said in my Statement of 8 July, all three inquiries will have full powers to compel disclosure of documents and attendance of witnesses.
	The inquiries will start work as soon as possible.

Crown Prosecutors

Lord Goldsmith: The review of the code for Crown Prosecutors, which I announced on 18 March 2004 (Official Report, col. WS25) is now complete. Copies of the revised code have been printed and have been placed in the Libraries of both Houses.
	The fundamental evidential and public interest considerations have not changed. However, the code has been amended to reflect the new role played by the Crown Prosecution Service in statutory charging whereby Crown Prosecutors, rather than the police, will normally decide whether or not to charge a suspect and will determine the appropriate charge or charges. The new code also properly reflects other key developments in the four years since the code was last reviewed. These include: the developing role of prosecutors in assisting the sentencing court and seeking post conviction orders such as anti-social behaviour orders; alternatives to prosecution such as conditional cautioning; and new public interest factors in favour of prosecution relating to confiscation and any other orders, children, and community confidence. To ensure the code's accessibility, it will be published in audio and Braille and, in addition to English and Welsh, the most commonly spoken community languages.
	I welcome the revised code and commend it to all prosecuting authorities. Copies of the code for Crown Prosecutors will be available on the Crown Prosecution Service website which can be found at www.cps.gov.uk

Zimbabwe: Asylum Seekers

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: In January 2002 my right honourable friend the Home Secretary announced the temporary suspension of removals of failed asylum seekers to Zimbabwe. This was in response to concerns at that time about the serious deterioration in the situation in Zimbabwe in the run-up to the presidential election held in March that year. We did not regard it as unsafe to return failed asylum seekers to Zimbabwe, but in view of the turbulent political conditions we considered that it would be appropriate not to enforce returns at that time.
	During the period of the suspension, asylum (and human rights) claims made by Zimbabwean nationals have continued to be considered on their individual merits in accordance with our obligations under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Each application is considered against the background of the latest available country information from a wide range of reliable sources including international organisations, non-governmental organisations, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the media.
	As with any other nationality, Zimbabweans who meet the definition of a refugee in the 1951 convention are granted asylum. If they do not qualify for asylum, but there are other circumstances that make them particularly vulnerable and engage our obligations under the ECHR, they are granted humanitarian protection or discretionary leave. If their application is refused, they have a right of appeal to the independent appellate authorities. In this way we ensure that we provide protection to those Zimbabweans who need it. But if an asylum and human rights claim by an individual of any nationality is refused, and any appeal to the independent appellate authorities is unsuccessful, that means that it would be safe for that particular individual to return to their country of origin.
	It is clear that there are Zimbabweans in need of international protection from persecution. Our asylum system provides that and will continue to do so. We have continued throughout the period of the suspension of enforced returns to consider cases and grant asylum or other forms of protection to Zimbabweans where necessary. The latest asylum statistics published today show that at initial decision stage in the first nine months of this year we granted asylum to 195 Zimbabweans and some other form of protection to more than 25 others. But this was out of a total of 2,025 decisions, meaning that very nearly 90 per cent of claims were refused. 82 per cent of subsequent appeals to the independent adjudicator were dismissed or withdrawn. The clear message is that the majority of Zimbabwean asylum applicants are able safely to return to Zimbabwe. We expect these individuals to leave voluntarily, and significant numbers have done so, but if they do not leave voluntarily we consider it entirely proper to seek to enforce their removal as we would nationals of any other country.
	While there has not been any improvement in conditions in Zimbabwe since enforced removal of failed asylum seekers was suspended, the proportion of claimants whose claims are not well founded has increased markedly over the period of the suspension. It is clear that the absence of enforced returns increasingly acts as a pull factor for Zimbabweans, and for others posing as Zimbabweans, who do not need international protection but none the less make asylum claims confident that even when unsuccessful they will not be forcibly removed. This is a misuse of the asylum system. We are therefore today bringing our policy on returns of failed Zimbabwean asylum seekers into line with that on every other country and ending the temporary suspension of enforced returns of failed Zimbabwean asylum seekers.
	This change in asylum policy does not reflect any change in our categorical opposition to human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. We will continue, bilaterally and with our international partners, to push the Government of Zimbabwe to end human rights abuses there and restore democracy, so that all Zimbabweans can in time return safely to help to build a prosperous and stable country. There is no doubt that political persecution, abuses of human rights and denial of basic freedoms persist in Zimbabwe and the asylum decision-making and appeal system will continue to ensure that Zimbabweans who face persecution and claim asylum in the UK will continue to receive the international protection they need.

Asylum Seekers: Dispersal

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: The National Asylum Support Service (NASS) has been reviewing its processes and policies with a view to increasing efficiency and reducing numbers in emergency accommodation.
	A concession in the dispersal policy, where NASS departed from the policy of dispersal if a family had a child that had attended a particular school for a year, was part of this review. The concession was designed to enable us to ensure that asylum seeker families in receipt of DWP benefits and who were transferring to NASS support, following receipt of a negative asylum decision (such cases are often referred to as disbenefited cases), could continue to be supported in the accommodation they had been living in while in receipt of benefits.
	We agreed in August that this concession should be amended. In considering the change, regard was given to the need to balance disruption to the education of a child with the availability of suitable accommodation in non-dispersal areas. Consideration was also given to the number of families who remained in emergency accommodation—which is not intended for long-term occupation—in London and other areas for long periods of time.
	The revised policy came into force on Friday 13 August 2004. The change in policy was announced by a letter dated 13 August, from the director of NASS to the membership of the National Asylum Support Forum, copied to LGA, ALG, COSLA and the Chief Asylum Support Adjudicator. A copy of the letter was placed on the Home Office website and NASS wrote to all families affected by this change.
	Under the new policy, dispersal is temporarily deferred where an asylum seeker has a dependent child in their household who has started the final school or college year leading up to their GCSE, AS or A-level exams (or their equivalents). This is provided they have been enrolled at that school or college for a significant part of the previous school or college year.
	However, families will not benefit from this concession if they have been unco-operative (for example if they have failed to travel to dispersal accommodation without reasonable excuse) or have switched the type of their NASS application without good reason, and this has resulted in their dispersal being delayed until their child is in the final school year leading to their GCSE, AS or A-level exam.
	Families with children who are in the school year leading to statutory assessment tasks (SATs) will not benefit from the concession.
	If a family has a child with special educational needs who has gained entry to an appropriate school, dispersal will normally be postponed until arrangements are in place for the child to transfer to a suitable school in the dispersal area.
	Cases that fall outside the revised criteria will be examined on their own merits, although the expectation is that dispersal will normally be appropriate.
	Families in emergency accommodation who applied for support before 13 August 2004—and whose dispersal may have been postponed as a result of the previous policy—have been reassessed under the new policy. This assessment took account of all known circumstances and consideration was given to whether dispersing the family would be reasonable. In order to minimise disruption to children and schools NASS aimed to arrange for a move to new accommodation to take place before the start of the new school year.
	Disbenefited families supported by NASS prior to 13 August 2004, who met the terms of the concession in place before that date and where arrangements have been made with a local authority to pay their rent and utilities, will not be reassessed under the new policy unless their accommodation becomes unsustainable for some reason.
	We are considering other changes to the policy on dispersal and we may announce any further changes to the House when decisions have been taken.

Yarl's Wood and Harmondsworth Disturbances

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: We are today publishing the report by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman, Stephen Shaw, of his investigation into the serious disturbance at Yarl's Wood Immigration Removal Centre on 14 and 15 February 2002.
	Immediately after the disturbance, Stephen Moore, a senior member of the Prison Service, was asked to conduct an investigation of what had happened. He made significant progress but was unable to have access to the information necessary to complete his investigation until associated court proceedings had been completed. On 19 June 2003, my right honourable friend the then Minister for Citizenship and Immigration announced in a Written Statement that she had decided that Stephen Shaw, who had been providing an independent overview of the work done up to that point, should take overall responsibility for the investigation, in order to ensure that it was fully independent. As Mr Shaw notes in his report, he had unfettered access to papers and staff. We are grateful to him for the care with which he has examined what was by any standards an extremely serious incident and for a very thorough report, and to Stephen Moore for the considerable effort he invested in the earlier stages of the investigation.
	The report criticises the handling by the contractor Group 4 of the incident which gave rise to the disturbances. It identifies weaknesses in design and materials which it attributes to the time constraints under which the centre was built, and which, in Mr Shaw's view, rendered it unfit for purpose and unable to withstand the assault on it that occurred on 14 and 15 February 2002. It finds that "the operation that ended the disturbance seems to have worked well", but that there was a lack of clarity as to who was in charge and the command structure. It notes the lack of information held centrally at that time on detainees, of the kind that would have supported a more effective risk assessment of the detained population.
	Stephen Shaw pays tribute, as I do, to the bravery shown by individual members of the Prison Service and Group 4 staff, by members of the emergency services and those detainees who rescued staff who were trapped. As he says, there was no loss of life, but the disturbance and fire were traumatic events for those involved.
	It is important to remember the context in 2000 and 2001, when the Yarl's Wood and Harmondsworth removal centres were built. Asylum applications had risen significantly in 1999 and remained at high levels. All those involved—Ministers and officials alike—were rightly convinced that part of the solution was the creation of significantly more detention accommodation than had previously existed to support the removal of failed asylum seekers. In that context, the creation of such additional accommodation was understandably seen as an urgent priority. It is easy to be wise with hindsight, but we readily acknowledge that the weaknesses in design and materials identified by Stephen Shaw existed and made the centre more vulnerable to a disturbance than it would otherwise have been.
	The important thing is that there were clear lessons to be learnt, and they were. As the report notes, the Colnbrook removal centre, which opened recently, was built to a much more robust design. The Harmondsworth centre, originally built to the same design as Yarl's Wood, was extensively refurbished, with the installation of sprinklers and the strengthening of parts of the infrastructure, as was the surviving part of Yarl's Wood. The command structure in the event of a disturbance was clarified and improved, and effort invested in staff training.
	We are also publishing today the report of an investigation of the more recent disturbance at Harmondsworth on 19 July this year by Sue McAllister, the head of the Security Group in the Prison Service. We are grateful also to Ms McAllister for her work. This has been a more limited investigation, because a number of those involved in the disturbance still face criminal proceedings. It is, however, clear from the report that, as a result of the refurbishments I have described, Harmondsworth was significantly more able to withstand a serious disturbance than would otherwise have been the case. Damage was limited, the command arrangements for responding to the incident generally worked well, and the restoration of order was, in Ms McAllister's words, "a successful operation" in which Prison Service, police and other staff acquitted themselves well. There were no injuries to either staff or detainees and there were no escapes from the centre. The centre was up and running again within three months of the incident. The inherent weaknesses in the design were, however, a factor in the extent to which the disturbance spread throughout the centre, and fire safety requirements limited the measures that could be taken to control detainees, including preventing their confinement to their rooms. Officials have been addressing urgently with the contractor and fire authorities what more can be done to improve control without jeopardising fire safety.
	Ms McAllister comments on the lack of systems for assessing the suitability of detainees for the open regime at Harmondsworth, and recommends a more strategic approach to the management of disruptive individuals. It is important to recognise that the expansion of the immigration removal estate was in part a result of the decision to end the practice of detaining immigration offenders in prisons. Since the Yarl's Wood disturbance, the Immigration and Nationality Directorate has strengthened arrangements for assessing the risk which individual detainees represent and for considering the case for moving disruptive detainees elsewhere in the estate or into prison accommodation. These arrangements are however being reviewed again in the light of experience at Harmondsworth and Ms McAllister's comments, and there are plans to enhance the assessment process. Perhaps the most significant development is that the new centre at Colnbrook, built to a more robust design, provides an option for managing the more difficult detainees short of transfer to the prison estate—an option which did not previously exist.
	These two reports highlight the challenge which the management of immigration detainees now represents. Detainees are not convicted criminals. As Stephen Shaw notes, one of the factors in the design of Harmondsworth and Yarl's Wood was the aim to create an environment which, while secure, was not a prison environment. These events have shown the tension between this aim and the need to maintain control and security. As Stephen Shaw notes in his report, as the effectiveness of the removals process increases, detainees are now spending, on average, much shorter periods in detention. This is, in itself, welcome, but it tends to raise levels of tension among the detained population and limits the scope for constructive activities of the kind that longer-term custodial institutions provide. That said, we have to ensure within the detention estate a humane regime that provides purposeful activities and is strong on contact between staff and detainees. That, rather than the structure of the buildings (important as that is), is the surest means by which the risk of disaffection and disturbance can be kept to the minimum. We have already accepted Stephen Shaw's recommendation (number 60) that a forum comprising officials, contractors and relevant interest groups be set up to consider provision of purposeful activity in removal centres. The forum will be chaired by the Senior Director, Operations in IND, and the Chief Inspector of Prisons will be invited to be represented.
	Stephen Shaw's report makes a large number of other recommendations, many of which have already been acted on, while others will now be considered carefully and progressed, along with relevant conclusions of Sue McAllister's report. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary has asked IND senior management to draw up an action plan based on these for publication in early 2005.
	There have been many improvements to the management of the detention system—indeed of IND as a whole—since these events took place but we are determined that we should learn any further lessons of these very serious events, and do everything we can to prevent a recurrence.

Future Rapid Effect System (FRES)

Lord Bach: My right honourable friend the Minister of State for Defence (Mr Adam Ingram) has made the following Written Ministerial Statement.
	I am pleased to announce that the Ministry of Defence has signed a contract with Atkins in respect of the Systems House role for the Future Rapid Effect System (FRES).
	The Ministry of Defence will be providing strategic direction, with Atkins, which is a major British company in this field, leading a number of key activities designed to inform MoD's major programme decisions during the assessment phase. Atkins's independence from product will enable it to take an objective view of the ideas and technologies which may be applicable to FRES, and marry new approaches to the knowledge that we already have as a result of previous work. Its comprehension of the risks inherent in complex systems of systems integration will be vital in determining feasible solutions. In addition, it will be managing a programme of risk reduction activities, mitigating the risks of certain technologies to determine if they are suitable for FRES. Technologies will be inserted into FRES only when they are sufficiently mature; whether initially or as part of an incremental technology insertion programme. The proactive management of these diverse de-risking activities will be key to achieving a manageable level of risk at the Main Gate investment point.
	We will seek maximum appropriate competition during all programme phases, enabling industry to engage at all levels, within the context of our defence industrial policy. We will be transparent and inclusive with industry from the earliest possible stage in terms of the defence industrial policy factors that may affect acquisition decisions. To this end, we have published a paper setting out our plans in this respect and identifying constraints where they apply. Understanding the broad factors that are likely to impact on those decisions will enable industry to make informed judgments on whether they wish to bid and, if they choose to do so, to ensure that their bids take due account of the declared criteria.
	Finally, FRES is a complex programme, with obvious tension between competing demands such as capability, time to delivery and affordability. However, the award of this contract to Atkins provides us with the necessary industrial expertise and realism to examine those competing demands in detail and to make informed decisions in order to achieve the optimum FRES solution.

Côte D'Ivoire

Lord Bach: My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Geoffrey Hoon) has made the following Written Ministerial Statement.
	In a Statement on 11 November 2004, I outlined the military planning that was in hand to support an evacuation of UK nationals from Côte d'Ivoire.
	The deteriorating security conditions in Côte d'Ivoire last week subsequently led to an evacuation of UK nationals from the country, following a recommendation by Her Majesty's Ambassador to Côte d'Ivoire that he judged this a prudent course of action. This recommendation was formulated after receiving technical military advice from the operational liaison and reconnaissance team, which had deployed on 10 November 2004 to monitor the situation in the region as part of the Ministry of Defence's contingency planning.
	The spearhead lead element was initially deployed to a forward mounting base in Accra, Ghana, where the operation was commanded by elements of the UK's Joint Task Force Headquarters. The majority of these forces were drawn from the spearhead lead element based on the 1st Battalion Royal Gurkha Rifles, but the operation was supported and enabled by Royal Air Force transport aircraft from RAF Brize Norton and RAF Lyneham. As an additional contingency measure, the Landing Platform Dock HMS "Albion" was also diverted towards Côte d'Ivoire.
	It is indicative of the Armed Forces' capacity to undertake comprehensive contingency planning, and their flexibility and capability to respond quickly to events, that within 24 hours of receiving a formal request from the Foreign Secretary nearly 300 service personnel were on the ground in Ghana, engaged in preparations for the evacuation.
	Between 11 and 13 November 2004, UK forces evacuated some 220 individuals from Abidjan and Yamoussoukro to Ghana, where the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had set up a reception centre to cater for the men, women and children who wished to leave Côte d'Ivoire.
	All service personnel involved in the evacuation operation have now returned to the UK, with the exception of HMS "Albion" which has returned to normal duties.
	The success of this operation is in no small part due to the high degree of co-operation that existed between the deployed forces, Her Majesty's Ambassador and his staff in country, and with international partners in the region, in particular Ghana and France.
	The successful completion and efficient recovery of our deployed forces is an impressive achievement and one which took place without impact on the UK's enduring commitments across the globe. This is testament to the professionalism of the men and women who serve in the UK Armed Forces and in particular to those who participated in this operation.

European Company Law: Cross-Border Mergers

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My right honourable friend the Minister for Industry and the Regions (Jacqui Smith): has made the following Written Ministerial Statement.
	The House will be aware that, between June and September 2004, the Government consulted on the proposed draft directive on cross-border mergers. The consultation document set out in factual terms how the provisions of the directive would operate and invited comments. Ten responses were received from companies, legal advisers and industry bodies. The Government are grateful to those who took the time and trouble to contribute.
	The Government support the facilitation of corporate restructuring activities across the European Union to promote the single market. An effective framework of European company law, which facilitates cross-border mergers and provides legal certainty and adequate safeguards for those who deal with the companies involved, is essential for that purpose. The proposed directive is intended to provide this.
	Responses to the consultation indicated that introducing a mechanism for cross-border mergers for UK companies would not have a significant impact, as UK companies have historically tended to favour restructuring by means of takeovers rather than mergers. Therefore, the Government intend to proceed with negotiations in a manner which is balanced and proportionate and which seeks to achieve the best outcomes for UK business. The Government will also look closely at options for implementation and consult further with stakeholders before decisions are taken on the most appropriate vehicle for implementation.
	Although there were a limited number of respondents, a variety of views were expressed on the scope of the directive (the types of company to which the directive should apply) whereas views tended to be more aligned on the issue of employee participation. As most respondents were clear that the scope of the directive should apply to small and medium enterprises as well as larger companies, the Government have sought to achieve a broad approach to scope—while ensuring that this provides necessary legal certainty.
	The Government have considered carefully the responses on the employee participation provisions of the directive. Employee participation is a system that exists within some EU countries (such as Germany and Sweden) for the representation of employees on the board of companies over a certain size. The term also covers employees' rights to recommend and/or oppose the appointment of board members. The consultation showed that there are concerns that this process could be too burdensome upon business if it were to follow the precedent set in the European company statute model, as this is a complicated, time-consuming and potentially costly solution. This model requires that there are negotiations on employee participation issues in cases where a European company is formed by cross-border merger involving one or more companies with an existing system of employee participation.
	Realistically, the Government cannot expect to negotiate a directive that would have the effect of removing employee participation rights where they exist in a company in another member state. For several member states, it is of fundamental importance to ensure that this directive does not undermine employee participation rights. Therefore, the Government have carefully considered the responses and will work towards an approach that keeps the burdens on UK companies to a minimum. In addition, it should be borne in mind that companies will be under no obligation to engage in a cross-border merger and if they do not elect to, there will be no impact upon them.
	Statutory mergers of the kind covered by the proposal are little used by UK companies and the evidence indicates that it is unlikely that UK companies will choose to merge with companies in countries that have high levels of employee participation. We intend to seek improvements to the proposal to develop a more flexible process for agreeing employee participation arrangements and are committed to the objective of making the merger process available and less burdensome for UK companies.
	I have placed copies of the summary of responses to the consultation in the Libraries of both Houses.

NHS Research Ethics Committees

Lord Warner: I announced at the Grand Committee on the Human Tissue Bill on 15 September (col. GC432) that I intended to seek independent advice on the operation of the research ethics committee system, including the Central Office for National Health Service Research Ethics Committees.
	I have asked Michael O'Higgins, a managing partner of PA Consulting Group Ltd, to chair a small ad hoc group of scientists and lay members. It will undertake a review of the systems that support NHS research ethics committees in England, and make recommendations for further steps to improve their operation, building on changes already under way.
	The group will first meet in November and will report to health Ministers by the end of March 2005. Details of the group's membership and terms of reference can be found on the department's website www.dh.gov.uk.